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PROTECTING WORKER COMPLAINTS AFTER MEYERS
INDUSTRIES
BARBARA J. FICK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the National Labor Relations Board in Meyers
Industries' effectively pulled the rug out from under many workers
who had previously enjoyed protection from retaliatory discharge for
work-related claims and complaints. The law does not leave those em-
ployees wholly unprotected, however. Other statutory and common-law
remedies are available to provide some of the protection afforded work-
ers under the National Labor Relations Act' (NLRA) before the Mey-
ers Industries decision.
This Article examines the effect of the Meyers Industries decision
on the protection available to workers under the NLRA, and discusses
other statutory and common-law remedies protecting workers now fore-
closed from NLRA protection as a result of Meyers Industries.
II. THE NLRA, CONCERTED ACTIVITY AND Meyers Industries
The underlying purpose of the NLRA is to eliminate obstructions
to the free flow of interstate commerce by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining between private sector employers
and their employees.3 To achieve this end, the NLRA protects the
rights of workers to form unions and regulates the relationship between
employers and unions.4 The essence of the statute is contained in sec-
tion 7, which lists the rights of workers under the NLRA.5
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Creighton University,
B.A. 1972; University of Pennsylvania, J.D. 1976.
1. 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 313, 352 (1985), on remand 281 N.L.R.B.
No. 118 (1986).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The NLRA applies only to private sector employers
and employees; it does not regulate federal, state, or local government employers. 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158 (1982).
5. Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
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The source of protection under the NLRA for work-related com-
plaints and claims is found in section 7, which gives employees the
right "to engage in other concerted activity for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 6 These employee rights
are protected from employer interference, restraint, or coercion.7 Thus,
in establishing the terms or conditions of employment, an employer
may not lawfully discriminate against an employee who has engaged in
concerted activity within the scope of section 7.8
The key term in section 7 is "concerted," and it is in defining this
term that the Meyers Industries case has its greatest impact. As the
Supreme Court noted in NLRB v. City Disposal System, Inc.:9
The term "concerted activities" is not defined in the Act but it
clearly enough embraces the activities of employees who have joined
together in order to achieve common goals. What is not self-evident
from the language of the Act, however, and what we must elucidate,
is the precise manner in which particular actions of an individual
employee must be linked to the actions of fellow employees in order
to permit it to be said that the individual is engaged in concerted
activity.10
A. Concerted Activity Before Meyers Industries
Before the Meyers Industries decision, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (Board) had broadly construed the term "concerted," ac-
cepting both indirect and direct evidence as being probative of whether
employees had engaged in concerted activity. The Board had not read
the concerted requirement out of section 7. To fall within the ambit of
"concerted" activity, it had always been necessary to show some link or
relation between the activity of an individual and the concerns or inter-
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
6. Id.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this title.
8. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Co., 373 U.S. 221, 231 (1963) (grant of
superseniority to non-strikers held discriminatory); NLRB v. Washington Aluminum
Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962) (discharge for engaging in concerted activity held discrimi-
natory). Discrimination regarding terms and conditions of employment includes not
only discharge, but also discipline, promotions, and wage rates.
9. 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
10. Id. at 830-31 (citation omitted).
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ests of other employees. 1
That link or relationship is clearly present when two or more em-
ployees act together on a work-related issue. 12 Just as clearly, an indi-
vidual worker voicing a purely personal complaint is not engaged in
concerted activity; there is no link between the activity of the solitary,
complaining worker and the concerns or interests of other workers.'8
Between those two extremes, however, the Board has been willing to
consider evidence showing that the act of an individual employee re-
lates to the concerns or interests of other workers. The fact that an
individual acted alone on his or her own authority is not, of itself, suffi-
cient to defeat a finding of "concerted" activity.
Thus, when an individual worker premises a complaint on a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the Board deems the complaint to be con-
certed activity because of the link created by the collective bargaining
agreement to other employees' interests. 4 In these circumstances, the
Board characterizes the individual's complaint as a continuation of the
concerted activity that produced the agreement in the first place. Fur-
ther, all employees share an interest in ensuring that the terms of the
agreement are honored by the employer.
This link between the individual's complaint and the interests and
activities of other employees created by the collective bargaining agree-
ment is known as the Interboro doctrine, stemming from the Board's
decision in Interboro Contractors, Inc. 5 The United States Supreme
11. See Continental Mfg. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 255, 256-58 (1965), in which an
employee's letter criticizing certain management actions regarding working conditions
was not found to be concerted activity. Because the letter was not approved by the
union, was not the result of group discussion, was not an expression of other employees'
views, and was not intended to enlist the support of other workers, there was no link
between the letter and the concerns or interests of other employees. See also North-
eastern Dye Works Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 1222, 1223 (1973) ("in order for [the com-
plaining worker's] complaints to have been protected, they must have related to the
correction of working conditions which were of concern to the group of employees al-
legedly being represented by him and he must have been speaking for the benefit of the
interested group, not merely for himself") (footnote omitted).
12. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (group of employees
distributing union newsletter); NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9
(1962) (group of employees engaged in a walk-out over lack of heat in work area).
13. See, e.g., Capitol Ornamental Concrete Specialties, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 851
(1980) (single employee complaint about road conditions); Tabernacle Community
Hosp. & Health Center, 233 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1977) (individual employee's letter pro-
testing supervisor's refusal to transfer her to another department).
14. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 278 (1975), enfd. per
curiam, 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976) (employee's refusal to drive an unsafe vehicle
protected by collective bargaining agreement conferring such a right); Interboro Con-
tractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966) (employees' complaint about working condi-
tions covered under the collective bargaining agreement was concerted activity), en-
forced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
15. Interboro, 157 N.L.R.B. 1295.
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Court endorsed the Interboro doctrine, and the rationale behind it, in
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc." The Court characterized inter-
circuit conflict over the Interboro doctrine as "reflect[ing] differing
views regarding the nature of the relationship that must exist between
the action of the individual employee and the actions of the group in
order for section 7 to apply."17 In affirming the Interboro doctrine, the
Court clearly stated that "the language of section 7 does not confine
itself to such a narrow meaning" of concerted as that of requiring the
presence of two or more employees working together toward a common
goal.18 So long as there exists a relationship between the action of the
individual and the action of the group, an individual can be engaged in
concerted activity even though he acts alone.' 9
In addition to the presence of a collective bargaining agreement,
the pre-Meyers Board considered other facts as evidence tending to
show the existence of a relationship between individual and group ac-
tion. In Alleluia Cushion, ° the company discharged a worker because
of his complaints, made to a state safety and health agency, alleging
violations of the state safety and health law. Although the individual
acted alone in making his complaints, the policy underlying the state
safety and health laws served as a link between his complaints and the
interests of the other workers. Thus:
[S]ince minimum safe and healthful employment conditions for the
protection and well-being of employees have been legislatively de-
clared to be in the overall public interests, the consent and concert of
action emanates from the mere assertion of such statutory rights."
This theory is very similar to the rationale underlying the Interboro
doctrine: just as all employees have an interest in ensuring the enforce-
ment of their contract, so too they have an interest in ensuring enforce-
ment of legislation designed to protect their safety at work. 2
16. 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
17. Id. at 831. The Court also noted that "[e]ven the courts that have rejected
the Interboro doctrine recognize the possibility that an individual employee may be
engaged in concerted activity when he acts alone." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
21. Id. at 1000.
22. This rationale was applied in subsequent cases involving unemployment com-
pensation, Self Cycle & Marine Distrib. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 75 (1978) (filing claims for
unemployment compensation benefits entitled to § 7 protection because the benefits
arise out of the employment relationship and are an aspect of national labor policy);
workers' compensation, Krispy Kreme Doughnut Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1979)
(workers' compensation benefits are of common interest to other employees and there-
fore filing a claim for benefits is protected under § 7), enforcement denied, 635 F.2d
304 (4th Cir. 1980); overtime claims, United Investment Corp., 249 N.L.R.B. 1058
(1980) (individual employee's claim for back overtime wages was concerted activity
[Vol. 31:823
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A corollary theory based on the Alleluia Cushion rationale held
that an individual employee's refusal to engage in activity in violation
of law was concerted activity." An employee's refusal to violate the
law represents an attempt to guarantee legal working conditions and to
ensure that the employer complies with the law.2 4 Those objectives
form the link between the individual employee's actions and the con-
cerns of other employees. When an employee acts to avoid violating
state law, his actions express the common concern of all employees
about their terms and conditions of employment.2
The case of Diagnostic Center Hospital28 illustrates a second
method for showing a relationship between an individual action and
group concern. The employees at the Center had discussed among
themselves their desire for a ten percent pay increase as well as their
dissatisfaction with what they perceived to be racism, sexism, and fa-
voritism in the workplace. Subsequently, employee Birdwell wrote a let-
ter to the employer outlining the complaints. Although Birdwell acted
on her own, the Board nevertheless found Birdwell's conduct to be
concerted.
Birdwell's conduct was concerted and protected irrespective of
whether she was overtly designated by other employees to act on
their behalf or informed any employee that she was doing so. It is
clear from the circumstances . . . that Birdwell's fellow employees
shared her concern and interest in the subject matter of the letter
and, consequently, that Birdwell was acting concertedly on behalf of
her fellow employees .2
Thus, the Board found that individual actions based on matters of mu-
tual concern to other employees were concerted. Evidence of the em-
when employee discussed the matter with fellow employees before filing the claim,
leading to similar claims by other employees); and wage discrimination, Country Club
of Little Rock, 260 N.L.R.B. 1112 (1982); Dawson Cabinet Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 290,
enforcement denied, 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977) (cases in which wage discrimina-
tion claims found to be concerted activity because of effect on other employees and
national labor policy).
23. See Transport Serv. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 910 (1982), enforcement denied, 720
F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1983); Ogden & Moffett Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 1349 (1981), enforced,
711 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983); Varied Enter. Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 126 (1979). Both
Transport Service and Ogden & Moffett concerned individual employee's refusal to
drive trucks weighing in excess of state weight limits. Varied Enterprises involved an
employee's refusal to drive a truck with a trailer of a length in excess of state length
limits.
24. Varied Enter., 240 N.L.R.B. at 132.
25. Transport Serv., 263 N.L.R.B. at 912.
26. 228 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1977).
27. Id. at 1217. The Board, however, held that Birdwell's discharge did not vio-
late § 8(a)(1) because the employer was unaware of the fact that Birdwell had written
the letter; therefore, protected, concerted activity was not the reason for the discharge.
Id. at 1216.
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ployees' discussion of the issue, as in Diagnostic Center2 8 or evidence
that the resolution of the individual employee's grievance would affect
the other employees as well,29 can show the existence of mutual
concern.
The case of Akron General Medical Center0 presented the latter
situation. An employee complained to his employer on two separate oc-
casions that the presence of lint and dust in the work area made it
difficult for him to breathe. The Board found his complaint to be con-
certed, because the atmosphere in the workplace affected all employees.
The employee's objective in filing the complaint encompassed the well-
being of all the employees." The Board had previously expressed the
Akron rationale in Oklahoma Allied Telephone Co.,32 finding an indi-
vidual's grievance about heat and fumes in the workplace to be con-
certed, because conditions "could not have been adjusted favorably
without benefit from such adjustment flowing to the other
employees.""3
The notion that the link between individual action and group con-
cern could be established by indirect evidence did not render the con-
certedness requirement superfluous. Instead, indirect evidence provided
only a presumption of concertedness that could be overcome by "evi-
dence that fellow employees disavow such representation."3 4 Such was
the case in Comet Fast Freight, Inc.,35 in which an individual employee
28. See also Thermofil, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 1056 (1979), enforced, 650 F.2d 858
(6th Cir. 1981); Pink Moody, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 39 (1978); American Arbitration
Ass'n, 233 N.L.R.B. 71 (1977) (cases involving concerted activity resulting from dis-
cussions among employees).
29. See, e.g., Pink Moody, 237 N.L.R.B. at 40 (defective condition of a truck's
brakes was a matter of mutual concern because the truck was driven by multiple em-
ployees); Akron Gen. Medical Center, 232 N.L.R.B. 920 (1977) (resolution of an em-
ployee grievance over lint and dust was of concern to the health of all employees); Air
Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1064 (1977) (an individual employee's action in checking
on the employer's ability to meet the current payroll "encompassed the well being of
his fellow employees"), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1979).
30. 232 N.L.R.B. 920 (1977).
31. Id. at 927. See also Air Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1069.
32. 210 N.L.R.B. 916 (1974).
33. Id. at 920.
34. Alleluia Cushion, 221 N:L.R.B. at 1000. The concept of proving a prima
facie case by use of indirect evidence raising a presumption of the existence of the fact
in question is well known in employment discrimination law. In McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court provided a four-part model of,
indirect evidence creating a presumption that the employment action was based on
illegal discrimination. The presumption could be rebutted by the employer's evidence of
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. See also Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (defendant can rebut the
presumption by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
discharge).
35. 262 N.L.R.B. 430 (1982).
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refused to drive a truck that he reasonably believed was unsafe. Be-
cause other employees also drove this truck occasionally, the individ-
ual's "complaint involved a safety problem of concern to all of them." 6
The defendant successfully rebutted this presumption of concertedness
by offering direct evidence that the other employees did not mind driv-
ing the truck and did not join the plaintiff in his complaint. "Given
such record evidence, we [the Board] would be hard-pressed to rely
upon a supposition of common cause, which, in this particular case, has
no basis in fact."37
In summary, before Meyers Industries, if the Board found that
individual action was related to an issue of group concern, as evidenced
by a collective bargaining agreement, a work-based statutory right, or
other matters of mutual concern, then the individual action was pre-
sumed to be concerted.
B. Concerted Activity and Meyers Industries
1. Meyers and its Progeny: The Board Decisions.
Meyers Industries altered the requisite elements of the relation-
ship that must exist between the action of an individual employee and
the concerns of the group in order for individual action to be concerted.
In Meyers, Ken Prill, a truck driver, complained to his employer on
several occasions about the unsafe condition of the truck he was driv-
ing. When the company assigned another employee to drive the truck,
the second employee also complained about the truck's unsafe condi-
tion. On two separate occasions, once on a trip to Ohio and once in
Tennessee, Prill had complained to state authorities about the condition
of the truck, and each time the authorities issued a citation. The com-
pany then discharged Prill because of his complaints and his refusal to
drive the unsafe vehicle. 8 The administrative law judge found that the
discharge violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, on the "presumption
that an individual employee engages in concerted activity [within the
scope of section 7] where his conduct arises out of the employment
relationship and is a matter of common concern among all employ-
ees." ' 9 Although the employer could have rebutted the presumption by
showing that Prill's complaints were either not made in good faith, or
were peculiar to himself and were not shared by other employees, the
employer failed to do so." Prill's complaints, therefore, "inured to the
benefit of all employees and thus constituted protected concerted
36. Id. at 430 (quoting the finding of the administrative law judge).
37. Id. at 431.
38. 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497-98 (1984).
39. Id. at 506.
40. Id. at 508.
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activity.""'
The Board, however, reversed the decision of the administrative
law judge in Meyers, and in the process overruled Alleluia Cushion
and its progeny.42 The Meyers Board characterized the Alleluia ration-
ale as a subjective standard, in which the Board determined which is-
sues employees should be concerned about, instead of looking at "ob-
servable evidence" of group action to determine which issues actually
concerned the employees.4' The effect of the subjective standard, ac-
cording to the Meyers Board, was to shift the burden of proof to the
employer, who would have to prove that the activity was not
concerted.'
The Meyers Board proposed an "objective" standard of concerted
activity to replace Alleluia Cushion. The Meyers standard requires
that activity "be engaged in with or on the authority of other employ-
ees" in order to be concerted.4' There must be "observable evidence" of
the relationship between individual activity and group concern; in other
words, there must be direct evidence that the individual engaged in his
activity with other employees or on their authority." Indirect evidence
of such a relation will no longer suffice. The Meyers Board would con-
tinue to find activity concerted when two or more employees are in-
volved and in situations in which the Interboro doctrine is applicable. 7
The effect of this new definition of concerted activity is to remove from
the protection of section 7 those circumstances governed by the ration-
ale set forth in cases like Alleluia Cushion, Diagnostic Center, and Ak-
ron General Medical Center. A brief look at several post-Meyers cases
illustrates the decline in employee protection.
In Beardon & Company, Inc.,"s the employer had a policy of re-
fusing to recall laid-off employees who filed unemployment compensa-
tion claims during their layoffs. The Board held that neither the em-
41. Id.
42. Id. at 496. The Board rejected the Alleluia rationale after looking to several
factors including: legislative history and intent of the National Labor Relations Act;
early interpretations of the Act; literal language of the Act; and rejection of the ration-
ale by several appellate courts. Id. at 493-96.
43. Id. at 495.
44. Id. at 496. As Board Member Zimmerman pointed out in his Meyers dissent,
however, the creation of presumptions by the Board is not a new phenomenon and has
received the approval of the Supreme Court. Id. at 502. Moreover, the burden which
shifts to the employer after the presumption is raised is not, as the Meyers Board sug-
gested, the burden of proof, but instead the burden of production of evidence sufficient
to rebut the presumption. Id. at 503.
45. Id. at 496-97.
46. For example, if the individual was an appointed spokesperson for the group.
Id.
47. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
48. 272 N.L.R.B. 931 (1984).
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ployer policy nor its implementation violated section 8(a)(1).4 9 Filing
an unemployment compensation claim did not satisfy the objective
standard for concerted activity; an unemployment compensation claim
is an individual act, which does not concern or involve any other em-
ployee.50 Although the employer's policy interfered with the filing of an
individual claim, the policy did not interfere with cgncerted activity.5
Moreover, the Board found the simultaneous filing of claims by mem-
bers of an employee group to be insufficient for a showing of concerted
activity. The Board reasoned that the employees would be filing sepa-
rate and independent claims, the validity of which would be indepen-
dent of the validity of any other claim."
In Jefferson Electric Co.," fumes spreading throughout an em-
ployer's plant sickened eleven employees, hospitalizing three of them.
One of the hospitalized employees filed a complaint with the state
safety and health agency and was subsequently discharged by the com-
pany.54 Relying on Meyers, the Board held that the discharge did not
violate section 8(a)(1) because there was no evidence that the employee
in question had consulted with any other employees before filing the
complaint, nor had any other employees been involved in the actual
filing.55
Lastly, in Mannington Mills," several employees complained to
their elected employee representative on a joint management-employee
committee about performing a certain type of work. The employee rep-
resentative conveyed the complaint to the committee, which told him to
discuss the issue with the foreman. The representative told the foreman
that he and the other employees objected to performing the work at
issue and would not do so in the future.57 The Board found that dis-
charging the representative for making the threat to refuse to work did
not violate section 8(a)(1) because the threat had not been authorized
by the other employees.5 8 The employees' complaint did not include
such a threat and the representative did not discuss the threat with the
employees. Thus, although the representative's complaint to the fore-
man was concerted activity because it was made on the authority of
49. Id.
50. Id. at 932 n.2. Compare this result with the pre-Meyers case Self Cycle &
Marine Distrib. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 75 (1978), in which the Board held unemployment
benefits to be a matter of common interest to other employees.
51. Beardon & Co., 272 N.L.R.B. at 932.
52. Id. at 932 n.2.
53. 271 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1984).
54. Id.
55. Id. Compare this result with the pre-Meyers case Alleluia Cushion, 221
N.L.R.B. 999 (1975)
56. 272 N.L.R.B. 176 (1984).
57. Id.
58. id.
1987]
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
other employees, the threat to refuse to perform the work was not au-
thorized and therefore not concerted. 9
2. Appeals and Remands
On appeal, the Board's decision in Meyers Industries was re-
manded by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.60 A companion
case, Herbert F. Darling, Inc., 1 was remanded by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit. In remanding those cases to the Board,
both circuit courts held that the literal interpretation of concerted ac-
tivity adopted in Meyers Industries was not required by the National
Labor Relations Act. 2
The Second Circuit specifically discussed a presumption of con-
certed activity based on an individual's assertion of a statutory right.
59. Id. Compare this result with the pre-Meyers case Steere Dairy, Inc., 237
N.L.R.B. 1350, 1351 (1978) (employee's complaint made on behalf of all company
employees and therefore concerted).
A recent decision, however, indicates a possible retrenchment from the rationale
espoused in Mannington Mills. In Every Woman's Place, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48
(1986), members Johansen and Stephens held that an employee's individual call to the
Department of Labor Wage-Hour Division concerning overtime pay was a continuation
of earlier group complaints about overtime made to the employer, and therefore was
concerted activity. They found "concert" even though no other employee authorized
the individual to make the call, and no other employees were aware that such a call
was made. "It is immaterial that she was not following express instructions from the
other employees in doing so. It was specifically noted in Meyers that, when the record
showed the existence of a group complaint, the Board would not require evidence of
formal authorization in order to find that steps taken by individuals in furtherance of
the group's goals are a continuation of activity protected by Section 7 of the Act." 282
N.L.R.B. No. 48, slip op. at 2-3. Member Stephens distinguished the Mannington
Mills case by noting that the unauthorized statement was a threat of a partial work
stoppage that arguably constituted unprotected activity; he posited that specific author-
ization may be required when the individual employee's conduct concerns unprotected
activity. Id. at 3 n.4. Neither Stephens nor Johansen were Board members when Man-
nington Mills was decided; both were on the Board when Meyers II issued, although
Johansen did not participate in that decision.
Board Chairman Dotson dissented in Every Woman's Place, finding the decision
to be a departure from the Meyers analysis. Chairman Dotson would require a finding
that individual action was "performed on authority of the protected group" in order for
it to be concerted. Id. at 7-8. See also Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 101
(1987).
60. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
61. 273 N.L.R.B. 346 (1984), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ewing v. NLRB,
768 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985). In that case, the Board found that an employer who re-
fused to recall a laid-off employee based on the mistaken belief that the employee had
complained to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration had not violated §
8(a)(1). There was no evidence that the employer thought the employee had acted with
others in making the complaint; thus the employer did not believe the employee was
engaged in concerted activity.
62. Ewing, 768 F.2d at 54; Prill, 755 F.2d at 950.
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"Group support may rationally be assumed, absent evidence to the con-
trary, because fellow employees presumably want to be free to assert
such a right without fear of losing their jobs." 3 The court noted that
the presumption could be rebutted by employer evidence that the indi-
vidual's action was frivolous or in bad faith.6 4
Neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Second Circuit prohibited the
Board from adhering to its interpretation of "concerted" as adopted in
Meyers Industries. The decisions merely stated that the "objective"
standard of Meyers is not mandated by the language of the statute.
The Board may still adopt that standard based on its belief that such a
definition better effectuates the policies behind the Act."
On remand, the Meyers Board elected to adhere to the definition
of concerted activity as formulated in the original Meyers decision.66
"[W]e [the Board] have exercised our discretion and have chosen the
Meyers I definition over other possibly permissible standards ....1-67
The Board found this interpretation "most responsive to the central
purposes for which the Act was created."66
The focus of the NLRA is on collective activity, and protection of
that activity "lies at the heart of the Act."69 The Board focused on
collective activity as the touchstone for its interpretation of the scope of
concerted activity within the meaning of section 7.70
The Board also found the analysis contained in Meyers I to be
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in City Disposal. In City
Disposal, the Court's inquiry focused on the nexus joining the individ-
ual employee's action to the actions of the group.71 In collective bar-
gaining cases, the Court found this link to be based upon two factors:
first, an individual's assertion of a right under the collective-bargaining
agreement is an extension of the collective activity that produced the
agreement; and second, the assertion of that right affects all employees
in the bargaining unit.72 The Board acknowledged that the second fac-
tor resembles the rationale of Alleluia Cushion, which deemed an indi-
vidual employee's attempt to enforce statutory rights designed for the
benefit of all employees to be concerted. The Board found, however,
63. Ewing, 768 F.2d at 55.
64. Id. at 56. This holding is consistent with prior Second Circuit cases that
accept the presumption of concerted activity absent a showing by the employer of bad
faith on the employee's part. See, e.g., Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 662
(2d Cir. 1966).
65. Id. at 56; Prill, 755 F.2d at 956-57.
66. Meyers Indus. Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 2 (1986).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 4.
69. Id. at 4-6.
70. Id. at 6-7.
71. Id. at 7-9.
72. id.
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that the Court's only subsequent reference to the second factor was to
link it to the "mutual aid and protection" clause of section 7, not the
concerted activity clause. Thus, the first factor contained the thrust of
the Court's analysis of the term "concerted. 7 3
Although the Board agreed that efforts to enforce statutory rights
of benefit to other employees are for the purpose of mutual aid or pro-
tection, this by itself does not satisfy the showing necessary for "con-
certed activity." The invocation of statutory rights cannot fairly be con-
sidered an extension of collective activity. In the absence of a link to
collective activity, the individual's acts are too remotely related to the
activities of other employees.74 Thus, the guidelines that the Board
gleaned from City Disposal supported the Meyers definition of con-
certed activity.
This "new" definition does not state that individual employee con-
duct can never be concerted, but instead places limits on when the act
of an individual is concerted.75 Thus, an individual employee who
presents a work complaint to management can be engaged in concerted
activity if the group specifically authorizes the employee to speak on
their behalf, or the group relies on the individual employee's action to
protect their rights.7 6 Additionally, the Meyers I definition encompasses
individual action that seeks to induce group action. 7 Finally, even if an
individual is not engaged in concerted activity, his discharge may vio-
late section 8(a)(1) if it has a "chilling effect" on other employees'
concerted activities.78
Having reaffirmed the Meyers Industries' objective standard of
concerted activity, the Board now interprets the NLRA as leaving un-
protected those individual workers who exercise employment-based
statutory rights, or act alone in furtherance of general employee con-
cerns. The remainder of this Article will discuss alternative statutory
and common-law protections available to workers in such
circumstances.
73. Id. at 8-9.
74. Id. at 17-19. The Board also noted that, although it is required to interpret
the labor laws "so as to accommodate the purposes of other Federal laws," this does
not mean that the Board is required to enforce these other laws. Id. at 19.
75. Id. at 11.
76. Id. at 13-15.
77. Id. at 15-16. In Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (1986) (a post-
Meyers I case), the Board found that the demotion of an employee for her conversa-
tions with individual employees informing them of company promotions violated §
8(a)(l). Section 7 protection extends to employee concerted activity that, at its incep-
tion, involves only a speaker and a listener.
78. Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, at 20-21; see also Unico Replacement
Parts, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1986) (chilling effect resulting from supervisor
threat to employee regarding complaints).
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III. STATUTORY PROTECTION OF WORKER COMPLAINTS
A. Scope and Range of Anti-retaliation Statutes
Many federal and state statutes regulating the employment rela-
tionship contain specific anti-retaliation provisions, commonly included
because of the relationship between the employer and employee-the
employee is in an economically dependent position vis-a-vis the em-
ployer.79 The employer controls the wages received by the employee, as
well as the job itself. The employee who seeks to assert the rights and
protections provided by employment legislation is in an especially vul-
nerable position because of his dependence on the employer who is the
target of the legislation.
Employers are generally not pleased with laws restricting their
managerial prerogatives, and tend to react negatively when these re-
strictions are enforced. The natural target for this reaction is the em-
ployee. Recognizing this situation, legislatures attempt to prevent the
problem by including anti-retaliation provisions in many employment-
related statutes.9 0
79. The Supreme Court has recognized this situation:
And any balancing of those rights must take into account the economic de-
pendence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency
of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications
of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested
ear. Stating these obvious principles is but another way of recognizing that
what is basically at stake is the establishment of a nonpermanent, limited
relationship between the employer, his economically dependent employee
and his union agent ....
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
80. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960). In
that case, the Court stated:
For it needs no argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might
often operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard
conditions. By the proscription of retaliatory acts . . . Congress sought to
foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive provision of the
[Fair Labor Standards] Act would be enhanced.
Id. at 292 (citation omitted). See also Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256, 260
(6th Cir. 1980) ("There was concern, however, that the possibility of retaliatory dis-
charge might inhibit employees from reporting OSHA violations. As a result, both the
House and the Senate inserted provisions prohibiting discrimination against employees
who report OSHA violations.") (citation omitted); Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine
Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Miners who insist on health
and safety rules being followed . . . are not likely to be popular with . . . mine top
management. Only if the miners are given . . . protection from reprisal after making
complaints, can the Mine Safety Act be effectively enforced."), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
938 (1975).
At the federal level alone, there are over a dozen laws protecting private sector
workers who raise health and safety concerns about the workplace. As will be seen
from the discussion in the text which follows, although the purpose behind these laws is
uniform, their coverage and enforcement provisions lack consistency and congruity. Re-
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Anti-retaliation provisions usually fall into four broad categories:
(1) protection of workers who participate in enforcing the statute;" (2)
protection of employees who voice their complaints about statutorily
protected subject matter directly to their employers; 2 (3) protection of
employees who engage in activity opposing conduct prohibited by the
statute;83 and (4) protection of employees who refuse to work in unsafe
conditions.8 ' The categories are not mutually exclusive; many anti-re-
taliation provisions include protections falling into more than one cate-
gory."8 The courts have broadly construed the protections afforded in
anti-retaliation provisions so as to effectuate the legislative policies be-
hind the statutes."
The scope of activities covered by these provisions includes not
only the actual filing of a complaint with an agency charged with en-
forcing the statute at issue, but also encompasses testifying in connec-
tion with any proceedings instituted under the statute, as well as assist-
ing the agency in its investigatory efforts. 87 Although anti-retaliation
acting to this patchwork quilt of employee protection, the Administrative Conference of
the United States has suggested that "uniform treatment of whistleblowers would pro-
vide a more coherent statutory scheme, and would better serve [the] underlying health
and safety purposes." Accordingly, the Conference has proposed draft recommenda-
tions addressing the inconsistencies and improving the adjudicatory procedures. See
Federal Protection of Private Sector Health and Safety Whistleblowers, 52 Fed. Reg.
7879 (1987)
81. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2622(a) (West
1982); NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1982); Fair Labor Standards Act [hereinafter
FLSA], 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982); Age Discrimination in Employment Act [here-
inafter ADEA], 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act
[hereinafter OSHA], 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982); Mine Safety and Health Act
[hereinafter MSHA], 30 U.S.C.A. § 815(c)(1) (West 1986); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter Title VII], 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982); Energy
Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(a) (West 1983); Railroad Safety Act, 45
U.S.C.A. § 441(a) (West Supp. 1986); Commercial Motor Vehicles Act, 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 2305(a) (West Supp. 1986).
82. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2622(a) (West
1982); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1982); OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982);
MSHA, 30 U.S.C.A. §815(c)(1) (West 1986); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(1982); Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(a) (West 1983).
83. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1982); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 3(a)
(1982).
84. See, e.g.. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982); Railroad Safety Act, 45
U.S.C.A. § 441(b) (West Supp. 1986); Commercial Motor Vehicles Act, 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 2305(b) (West Supp. 1986).
85. See, e.g., OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)
(1982); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
86. See, e.g., NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972); DeFord v. Secre-
tary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1983); Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine
Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938
(1975).
87. See Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972) (NLRA protects the filing of a com-
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clauses in all employment legislation protect participation activity, a
few statutes also protect an even broader range of employee activity
related to exercising statutory rights. Thus, some provisions protect not
only complaints made to an enforcing agency, but also those made di-
rectly to the employee's employer. The Mine Safety and Health Act
(MSHA) specifically protects complaints notifying a mine operator of
alleged dangers or safety and health violations."8 Courts have inter-
preted the provision in the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) protecting an employee who exercises "any right afforded by
this Act"89 as including safety complaints made to the employer.90
Some courts have also construed the general participatory activity pro-
tection provided by the Energy Reorganization Act91 as including inter-
nal complaints made by an employee to his employer."
Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"3 and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act9" (ADEA) protect employee opposition
activity as well as participation activity. Opposition activity encom-
passes employee protests against unlawful employment discrimination
based on race, sex, religion, national origin or age.98 Those protests can
take the form of complaints about discriminatory treatment made di-
plaint, giving testimony during agency proceedings, and providing information during
investigation); Donovan v. Stafford Constr. Co., 732 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(MSHA protects the giving of statements to government representatives conducting
safety investigations); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir.
1969) (Title VII protects the filing of a charge with an agency even if it contains false
or malicious statements).
88. 30 U.S.C.A. § 815(c)(1) (West 1986).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982).
90, See Donovan v. Freeway Constr. Co., 551 F. Supp. 869, 878 (D.R.I. 1982)
("the activities protected by this section include an employee's expression of concern
relative to health and safety standards, whether directed to his employer, or to
OSHA") (citations omitted); Marshall v. Springville Poultry Farm, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
2, 3 (M.D. Pa. 1977). For a discussion of the scope of OSHA's anti-retaliation clause,
see Comment, Retaliatory Discrimination Actions Under Section 11 (c) of OSHA: Too
Many Rights, Not Enough Protection, 1981 B.Y.U.L. REv. 909.
91. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(a) (West 1983).
92. See Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Sys. Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th
Cir. 1984) (anti-retaliation provision of the Energy Reorganization Act was modeled
on, and serves the same purpose as the provision in MSHA and thus should be inter-
preted consistent with MSHA); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2d
Cir. 1982). But see Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1984)
(purely internal complaints not protected by the Energy Reorganization Act).
93. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
94. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1982). The ADEA provision was modeled after
one found in Title VII.
95. The employment discrimination generating the opposition activity need not
actually be unlawful, so long as the employee engaging in the opposition activity rea-
sonably believes it to be unlawful. See Monteriro v. Poole Silver Co., 612 F.2d 4 (1st
Cir. 1980); Berg v. LaCrosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1980); Sias v. City
Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978).
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rectly to the employer," peaceful picketing for the purpose of publiciz-
ing discriminatory conduct, 97 or even refusal to participate in illegal
discrimination." This area represents the broadest range of protection
offered by anti-retaliation provisions.
A few statutes expressly protect employees' rights in refusing to
work in unsafe circumstances. The Commercial Motor Vehicles Act
prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee for the
employee's refusal to operate a vehicle if operating the vehicle would
violate federal law or rules regulating commercial motor vehicle safety
and health,9 or when the employee has a "reasonable apprehension of
serious injury to himself or the public because of the unsafe condition"
of the vehicle. 100 The Railroad Safety Act protects railroad employees
who refuse to work under hazardous conditions that a reasonable per-
son would conclude present imminent danger of death or serious in-
jury. 1  The courts have construed both OSHA and MSHA as protect-
ing an employee's refusal to work when the employee has a reasonable,
good-faith belief that working conditions present an imminent risk of
death or serious bodily injury.102
96. See Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 410 F. Supp. 770, 784 (W.D.N.C. 1975),
affid, 551 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1977).
97. See Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
98. See, e.g., EEOC v. St. Anne's Hosp., 664 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1981). For
discussions of the scope of Title VlI's anti-retaliation clause, see Denis, Title VII Re-
taliation Claims, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 642 (1984); Kattan, Employee Opposition to
Discriminatory Employment Practices: Protection from Reprisal Under Title VII, 19
WM. & MARY L. REV. 217 (1977).
99. 49 U.S.C.A. § 2305(b) (West Supp. 1986). An example of such a rule would
be the Department of Transportation regulation limiting the number of driving hours
during a certain period of time. See 49 C.F.R. § 395 (1985).
100. 49 U.S.C.A. § 2305(b) (West Supp. 1986). To avail himself of this protec-
tion, an employee's apprehension must be such that a reasonable person under the cir-
cumstances would conclude there was a bona fide danger of accident or injury due to
the unsafe condition of the vehicle. Id. The employee must also have attempted to have
the employer correct the problem. Id.
101. 45 U.S.C.A. § 441(b) (West Supp. 1986). The refusal to work must be
made in good faith and, when possible, communicated to the employer. Additionally,
the danger must be such that there is insufficient time to correct the problem through
regular channels. Id. See also Boston & Maine Corp. v. Lenfest, 799 F.2d 795, 803
(1st Cir. 1986).
102. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980). The Court, in af-
firming OSHA's protection of refusals to work, noted that this interpretation was con-
sistent with the interpretation Congress intended the courts to give to the parallel anti-
retaliation clause in MSHA. The Court stated that the legislative history of MSHA
evinced Congressional intent to protect refusals to work in unsafe or unhealthy condi-
tions. Id. at 13 n.18. See also Miller v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 687 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1982) (MSHA allows employees to forego work be-
cause of unsafe or unhealthful conditions); Drapkin, The Right to Refuse Hazardous
Work after Whirlpool, 4 INDUs. REL. L.J. 29 (1980).
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The anti-retaliation clauses in these statutes prohibit not only the
discharging of employees, but also discrimination regarding any term
or condition of employment,103 such as reductions in pay, and demo-
tions. The remedies under these provisions require the employer to
make-whole the employee in question, for example by awarding rein-
statement and backpay.
The enforcement procedures for most of these statutes are con-
trolled by the Secretary of Labor. The discriminatee must file a com-
plaint with the Secretary of Labor who, after an investigation, deter-
mines if the charge has merit. When merit is found, an evidentiary
hearing is held, usually before an administrative law judge who issues
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a remedial order.10 4 Under
both the Railroad Safety Act and the NLRA, the discriminatee files
his or her charge with the National Railroad Adjustment Board or the
NLRB, respectively, instead of with the Secretary of Labor.106
Most of these statutes do not provide for a private cause of ac-
tion.106 The exceptions to this general rule are the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA), Title VII, and the ADEA. Under the FLSA, any
individual whose rights have been infringed may institute an action
against his employer in any federal or state court of competent jurisdic-
tion.10 7 With respect to Title VII and the ADEA, an individual may
file suit' 08 upon exhausting specified administrative prerequisites. 0 9
103. The anti-retaliation provisions in these statutes are generally worded to pro-
hibit an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee.
104. See, e.g.. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2622(b) (West
1982); OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1982) (providing for an evidentiary hearing in
federal district court instead of before an administrative law judge); MSHA, 30
U.S.C.A. § 815(c)(2) (West 1986); Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §
5851(b) (West 1983); Commercial Motor Vehicles Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 2305(c) (West
Supp. 1986).
105. Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 441(c) (West Supp. 1986); NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
106. See, N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (General
Counsel has sole authority to issue complaints under NLRA); Taylor v. Brighton
Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980) (no private cause of action under OSHA).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
108. Case law suggests that a Title VII claimant may file suit only in federal
court. See Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1986);
Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1984). The ADEA, however, provides
that suit may be filed in either federal or state court. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1982). See
also Jacobi v. High Point Label, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 518, 521 (M.D.N.C. 1977)
("clearly Congress intended for a person aggrieved by a violation of the Age Discrimi-
nation Act to have the right to bring his action in State court").
109. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 487-97 (regarding ADEA), 1013-1072 (regarding Title VII) (2d ed. 1983);
Bukes, Administrative Prerequisites to Litigation Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964-Recent Developments, 17 DUQ. L. REv. 633 (1979); Comment, Jurisdic-
tional Prerequisites to Private Actions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
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Finally, many states have enacted workplace legislation that mir-
rors the laws passed on the federal level. Many of these statutes also
contain anti-retaliation provisions similar to those found in federal
workplace legislation. 110
B. Scope and Range of Whistleblower Statutes
Another type of statutory protection afforded workers who make
work-related complaints is found in so-called "whistleblower" laws. In
general, whistleblower statutes prohibit an employer from retaliating
against an employee who has reported suspected violations of any state
or federal law, rule, or regulation. Whistleblower statutes are much
broader in scope than anti-retaliation provisions, which are somewhat
limited in their protection to employees."' The primary purpose of a
1964, 41 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1976); Comment, Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 457 (1977);
Note, The Procedural Requirements of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 540 (1978).
110. For examples of anti-retaliation provisions in wage laws, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 23.10.135(6) (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-69(a) (West 1972); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 387-12(a)(3) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1210(b) (1981); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26 § 671 (West 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 177.32(2) (West Supp. 1986);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a 24 (West Supp. 1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 104.10 (West
1974).
Examples of anti-retaliation provisions in discrimination laws may be found in:
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(4) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(4)
(West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(5) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(a)(4)
(1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4572(E) (West 1979); MINN. STAT. REV. §
363.03(7) (West Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(d) (West Supp. 1986); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.322(3) (West Supp. 1986).
Anti-retaliation provision in safety laws may be found in: ALASKA STAT. §
18.60.089 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-379 (West Supp. 1986); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 396-8(e) (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 88.9(3) (West 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 182.669 (West Supp. 1986); NEv. REV. STAT. § 618.445 (1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
101.595(2) (West Supp. 1986).
Some of the state anti-retaliation provisions do not provide make-whole remedies
for the employee (i.e., reinstatement and backpay), but instead subject the employer to
a monetary fine for each violation. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.140 (1984) (fine or
imprisonment for retaliatory acts under wage law); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-69(a)
(West 1972) (fine under wage law); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1210(b) (1981) (fine under
wage law); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 671 (West 1974) (fine under wage law) with
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.130 (1984) (make-whole remedy for retaliatory acts under dis-
crimination law); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-379(b) (West Supp. 1986) (make-
whole remedy for retaliatory acts under safety law); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-5(0
(1985) (make-whole remedy under discrimination law); IOWA CODE ANN. § 88.9(3)
(West 1984) (make-whole remedy under safety law); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a 24
(West Supp. 1986) (fine and make-whole remedies under wage law); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§10:5-14.la and § 10:5-17 (West Supp. 1986) (fine and make-whole remedies under
discrimination law).
111. Anti-retaliation clauses, as demonstrated above, usually enforce only the
[Vol. 31:823
PROTECTING WORKER COMPLAINTS
whistleblower law is to protect the employee who reports the violation
of any type of law, whether work-related or not.
Twenty-two states,' 12 as well as the federal government,"3 have
adopted whistleblower laws. The statutes generally contain five basic
provisions: coverage, prohibited employer acts, protected employee con-
duct, enforcement, and remedies. The statutory coverage provisions de-
termine which groups of employers and employees are subject to the
law's regulation. Some statutes cover only state employers and employ-
ees;" 14 others cover all public sector employers and employees;" 5 and
0
rights specified in the statute containing the clause. Additionally, anti-retaliation
clauses are normally found only in legislation directly regulating workplace terms or
conditions of employment.
112. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §38-531-532 (1985); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102.5
(West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West Supp. 1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-6ldd (West Supp. 1986); Whistleblower's Act of 1986, ch. 86-
233, 1986 Fla. Sess. Laws Serv. 331 (West); Hawaii Whistleblowers' Protection Act,
1987 Act 267 §§ 1-9; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, 1 63b119c.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986);
IND. CODE ANN. § § 4-15-10-1 through 6 (Burns 1982 & Supp. 1986, as amended by
1987 P.L. 17-1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-3(a) through (d), as added by HB 1196,
L. 1987; IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-8-8(a) through (d), as added by HB 1196, L. 1987;
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-12-1-8(a) through (d), as added by HB 1196, L. 1987; IOWA
CODE ANN. § 79.28-.29 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (1984); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.101-103 (Baldwin 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1074.1
(West Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 §§ 831-40 (West Supp, 1986); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 64A § 12G (1983); MICH. STAT. ANN § 17.428(1)-(9) (Callaghan
1982 & Supp. 1986); The Whistleblowers' Protection Act, Ch. 275-E, as added by
1987 N.H. Laws ch. 386, effective Jan. 1, 1988; Conscientious Employee Protection
Act, ch. 105, 1986 N.J. Laws 343; N.Y. CIv. SER. LAW § 75(b) (McKinney Supp.
1986), amended by ch. 899, 1986 N.Y. Laws 1915; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney
Supp. 1986); ORE. REV. STAT. § 240.316(5) (1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-15-1 through
10 (Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a (Vernon Supp. 1986);
WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 42.40.010-.900 (Supp. 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.80-.89
(West Supp. 1986).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1982).
114. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-6ldd (West Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
127, 63bl 19c.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (1984); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 64A § 12G (1983); ORE. REV. STAT. § 240,316 (1986); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42.40.020 (Supp. 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.80 (West Supp. 1986).
The federal whistleblower protection, which is part of the Civil Service Reform Act,
covers only federal government employees. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(1) (1982).
115. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-531 (1985) (state and county employees);
Whistleblower's Act of 1986, ch. 86-233, 1986 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 331 (West); IND.
CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-1 (Burns 1982) as amended by 1987 P.L. 17-1984; IND. CODE
ANN. § 22-5-3-3(a) (this statute protects employees of private sector employers that
are under public contract where the employee's whistleblowing activity relates to the
execution of the public contract), as added by HB 1196, L. 1987; IND. CODE ANN. §
36-1-8-8(a), as added by HB 1196, L. 1987; IND CODE ANN. § 20-12-1-8(a), as added
by HB 1196, L. 1987; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.101 (Baldwin 1986); N.Y. CIv. SER.
LAW § 75(b) (McKinney Supp. 1986), amended by ch. 899, 1986 N.Y. Laws 1915;
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-15-2 (Supp. 1986); TEX REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
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some cover both public and private sector employers and employees.11
The range of employer acts prohibited by these laws covers the
entire spectrum of retaliatory employer conduct: discharge, discipline,
demotion, and wage decrease. 1" 7 The type of employee action protected
from retaliation varies considerably. Two issues are involved in deter-
mining protected employee action. First, the person or entity to whom
the employee makes disclosure must be ascertained. Second, the con-
tents of the disclosure must be determined. Some statutes protect the
employee who discloses information to either his employer or an appro-
priate government agency.118 Other statutes protect the employee only
when disclosure is made to an appropriate government agency.1 19 Two
statutes do not specify to whom the employee can disclose information,
suggesting that the employee is protected regardless of the person or
116. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
31-51m (West Supp. 1986); Hawaii Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 1987 Haw. Act
267 § 1; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1074.1 (West Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26 § 832 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(1) (Callaghan 1982);
The Whistleblowers' Protection Act, Ch. 275-E, as added by 1987 N.H. Laws ch. 386,
effective Jan. 1, 1988; Conscientious Employee Protection Act, ch. 105, 1986 N.J.
Laws 343, § 2(a); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (private sector em-
ployers and employees only; public sector protection is provided by N.Y. CIv. SER. LAW
§ 75(b) (McKinney Supp. 1986), amended by ch. 899, 1986 N.Y. Laws (1915).
The scope of this article focuses on private sector employers and employees since
these are the actors affected by the Meyers decision; the NLRA does not apply to
public sector employers or employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)(3) (1982). Thus, the discus-
sion of whistleblower statutes will be limited to those covering private sector employers
and employees.
117. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(b) ("No employer shall retaliate against an em-
ployee .... ); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(b) ("No employer shall discharge,
discipline or otherwise penalize any employee. . . ."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
30:1074.1(B)(2) (" 'action is taken' shall include hiring, layoff, lockout, loss of promo-
tion, loss of raise, loss of present position, loss of job duties or responsibilities, imposi-
tion of onerous duties or responsibilities .... "); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 833
("An employer shall not discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate against an em-
ployee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges
of employment . . . ."); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(2) ("An employer shall not dis-
charge, threaten or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the em-
ployee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment .... ");
Conscientious Employee Protection Act, ch. 105, 1986 N.J. Laws 344, § 2(e) (" 'Retal-
iatory action' means the discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other
adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of
employment."); N.Y. LAB LAW § 740(1)(e) (" 'Retaliatory personnel action' means the
discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action
taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment").
118. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 833; Conscientious Employee Protection Act,
ch. 105, 1986 N.J. Laws 344, § 3(a); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a).
119. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(b); Hawaii
Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 1987 Haw. Act 267 § 2; MIcH. STAT. ANN. §
17.428(2).
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entity to whom disclosure is made. 120 Although the scope of disclosure
under these statutes would probably encompass participation in, and
certainly encompass testimony given in, a government investigation,
hearing, or proceeding, several statutes specifically protect such em-
ployee activity.12 1
Regarding the content of the information disclosed, most of the
private sector statutes refer to either disclosures made when the em-
ployee has reasonable cause to believe there is a violation of state or
federal laws, rules, or regulations, 2 2 or to disclosures of suspected vio-
lations. 123 Two statutes limit the type of information that may be safely
disclosed. The New York law protects disclosure of violations only if
the violations in question create a substantial and specific danager to
the public health and safety.' 24 Louisiana protects only reports or com-
plaints about possible environmental violations.' 2 5 Additionally, some of
the statutes protect employees from retaliation for refusing to engage in
activity in violation of state or federal law.'
Of the nine private sector statutes, eight specifically provide for
private causes of action to enforce their protections. 27 The remedies
120. The Whistleblowers' Protection Act, Ch. 275-E:2, as added by 1987 N.H.
Laws ch. 386, effective Jan. 1, 1988 (this statute requires, however, that the employee
must bring the alleged violation to the attention of a supervisor before reporting it to
others). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1074.1(A).
121. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(b); Hawaii Whistleblowers' Protection
Act, 1987 Haw. Act 267 § 2; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 833; MICH. STAT. ANN. §
17.428(2); The Whistleblowers' Protection Act, Ch. 275-E:2, as added by 1987 N.H.
Laws ch. 386, effective Jan. 1, 1988; Conscientious Employee Protection Act, ch. 105,
1986 N.J. Laws 344, § 3(b); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(b).
122. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(a); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 833; The
Whistleblowers' Protection Act, Ch. 275-E:2, as added by 1987 N.H. Laws ch. 386,
effective Jan. 1, 1988; Conscientious Employee Protection Act, ch. 105, 1986 N.J.
Laws 344, § 3(a).
123. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(b); Hawaii Whistleblowers' Protection
Act, 1987 Haw. Sess. Laws 267 § 2; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(2).
124. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a).
125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1074.1(A).
126. ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 833; The Whistleblowers' Protection Act, Ch.
275-E:3, as added by 1987 N.H. Laws ch. 386, effective Jan. 1, 1988; Conscientious
Employee Protection Act, ch. 105, 1986 N.J. Laws 344, § 3(c); N.Y. LAB LAW § 2(c).
The wording of the New York statute suggests that the protection for refusing to par-
ticipate in activity in violation of law is limited to the scope of protected disclosure
information, i.e., where the activity that violates the law creates a substantial and spe-
cific danger to the public health or safety.
127. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(c); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1074.1(B);
Hawaii Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 1987 Haw. Act 267 § 3; ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26 § 834; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(3); The Whistleblowers'Protection Act, Ch.
275-E:4, as added by 1987 N.H. Laws ch. 386, effective Jan. 1, 1988 (this statute
provides for a hearing before an administrative officer rather than a civil court); Con-
scientious Employee Protection Act, ch. 105, 1986 N.J. Laws 345, § 5; N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 740(4).
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provided by these statutes include reinstatement, monetary make-whole
damages (including backpay), and attorneys' fees. 1 8 The Louisiana
statute provides for triple damages, 1 9 and the New Jersey law includes
a provision for punitive damages. 30 The California law does not con-
tain specific enforcement provisions.' 3 '
A unique type of statutory protection for worker complaints is
available in Connecticut. Any employer who disciplines or discharges
an employee because of the employee's exercise of his constitutional
rights to free speech is liable to the employee for actual and punitive
damages, as well as reasonable attorneys' fees. 132 The Connecticut law
also covers discussions of employees with co-workers, complaints to em-
ployers, and disclosure of information to any person, consistent with
free speech rights.' 33
Thus, to the extent that an employee's work complaints are di-
rected at securing enforcement of statutory rights, the employee may
be statutorily protected against retaliation. The existence of statutory
protection depends on whether the statute that the employee is at-
tempting to enforce contains an anti-retaliation clause, or whether the
employee's conduct falls within the ambit of a whistleblower law. This
leaves the employee subject to questionable protection, sometimes dif-
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(c); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1074.1(B);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 835; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428(4); Conscientious
Employee Protection Act, ch. 105, 1986 N.J. Laws 345, § 5; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(5).
129. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1074.1(B).
130. Conscientious Employee Protection Act, ch. 105, 1986 N.J. Laws 345, §
5(f).
131. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5.
132. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West Supp. 1986).
133. The court in Andersen v. E.J. Gallo Winery, Civil No. H 85-295 (JAC),
Nov. 7, 1985 (D. Conn. 1986) (available on Westlaw DCTU), held that the extent of
an employee's protection under the Connecticut Free Speech Act should be based upon
the analysis of the Supreme Court in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). In evalu-
ating the free speech rights of public sector employees under the first amendment, the
Connick Court applied a balancing test between the interest of the employee in com-
menting on matters of public concern and the interest of the employer in promoting
efficiency and effectiveness in the services it performs. This formulation limits the em-
ployee's speech rights to comments on issues of public concern, leaving the employee
unprotected when the speech regards a purely personal matter. See Gaj v. United
States Postal Serv., 800 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1986) (postal employee's complaints concern-
ing workplace safety did not rise to a level of public concern but merely reflected the
employee's dissatisfacton with working conditions, and therefore were not constitution-
ally protected); Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 36 (1985) (discussing factors considered in distinguishing between work-related
complaints that are personal in nature from those of public interest); Callaway v.
Hafeman, 628 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (complaint of sexual harassment not
of public concern.). See generally Note, Public Employees' Free Speech Rights: Con-
nick v. Myers Upsets the Delicate Pickering Balance, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 173 (1984-85).
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fering from state to state for conduct that, before Meyers Industries,
was protected at the federal level.
IV. COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF WORKER COMPLAINTS
The general principle of employment law in the United States is
based on the "at-will" rule, by which employment for an indefinite
term is considered to be at the will of either the employer or the em-
ployee.8 4 In other words, the employer can discharge an employee for
good cause, no cause, or even bad cause without incurring civil liability;
conversely, the employee is free to leave his employment at any time
for any reason without incurring liability.135
The acceptance of the at-will principle first came under serious
134. This principle developed out of a statement in a treatise on master-servant
relationships that a "general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will." H.
WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877). The at-will rule was subsequently
adopted by state courts and became entrenched as a rule of law. See generally Heinsz,
The Assault on the Employment At Will Doctrine: Management Considerations, 48
Mo. L. REV. 855, 858-62 (1983); Jacoby, An Historical Analysis, in W. HOLLOWAY &
M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 3 (1985); Summers,
Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV.
481, 484-86 (1976); Comment, Employment At-Will in the Unionized Setting, 34
CATH. U.L. REV. 979, n.1, 982-85 (1985); Note, NLRA Preemption of State Law Ac-
tions for Wrongful Discharge in Violations of Public Policy, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REF.
441 n.2 (1986).
135. As noted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.
2d 247 (Miss. 1985), there is a substantial difference under this principle between em-
ployer's right to discharge and an employee's right to quit:
[W]e may not remain insensitive to the fact that the impact of termination
upon the employee is in general more adverse in a way that is qualitatively
different than what the employer experiences when it is the employee who
walks off the job. We approach this case cognizant of the force of Anatole
France's pointed observation that "the law, in its majestic equality, forbids
the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and
to steal bread."
Id. at 254 (footnote omitted).
Of course, the parties themselves may modify this common law arrangement by
contractually agreeing to restrictions on the at-will relationship. An obvious example of
such a contractual restriction is a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between
employer and union setting forth the terms and conditions of employment for bargain-
ing unit employees. These agreements commonly contain clauses prohibiting the dis-
charge of employees except for just cause, and also provide a mechanism in the griev-
ance-arbitration procedure for challenging employer discharges of employees. Recently,
provisions contained in company handbooks and manuals have been held to constitute,
under certain circumstances, legally enforceable restrictions on the at-will employment
relationship. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985),
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d
622 (Minn. 1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982). See gener-
ally W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
43-133 (1985); Heinsz, supra note 134, at 865-73.
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attack in 1959 by the California courts in Petermann v. Teamsters Lo-
cal 396.116 Petermann was employed by the Teamsters as a business
agent, when he was subpoenaed to appear and testify before a Califor-
nia legislative committee. Petermann's supervisor instructed him to give
certain false testimony before the committee, and Petermann refused.
The Teamsters discharged him the day after he testified. Petermann
then filed a civil complaint, alleging that his discharge was the result of
his refusal to commit perjury. 13 7
The court initially noted the existence of the at-will rule, but
found that its applicability could be limited by statute 8' or by consid-
erations of public policy. Although recognizing that the notion of public
policy is inherently imprecise, the court held that it embodied a princi-
ple of law that a person may not lawfully do that which is injurious to
the public good. 3 9 This principle imposes restrictions on otherwise pri-
vate dealings for the good of the community. Thus, the court held that
"[i]t would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to
public policy" to allow an employer to make continued employment
contingent on the employee's commission of an illegal act-in this case,
perjury. 40
The attack signalled by Petermann has steadily gained momentum
over the past fifteen years. The rationale behind the erosion of the at-
will rule has perhaps been best expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court
in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co."'
[U]nchecked employer power, like unchecked employee power, has
been seen to present a distinct threat to the public policy carefully
considered and adopted by society as a whole. As a result, it is now
recognized that a proper balance must be maintained among the em-
ployer's interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably, the
employee's interest in earning a livelihood, and society's interest in
136. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
137. Id. at 26.
138. Statutory limitations are found in such legislation as the NLRA provisions
prohibiting employer discharge of employees for union activities, Title Vil's provisions
prohibiting employer discharge of employees because of race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin, or the anti-retaliation statutes discussed supra notes 79-110 and ac-
companying text, which prohibit employer discharge of employees because the em-
ployee enforced his rights under the statute.
139. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27.
140. Id.
141. 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981). Palmateer alleged that he was discharged by
his employer, International Harvester, because he supplied information to local law
enforcement officers implicating a fellow employee in criminal activities, and agreed to
assist in the investigation and trial of the employee. The court held that Palmateer
stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy: "[t]here
is no public policy more basic . . . than the enforcement of the State's criminal code."
Id. at 879.
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seeing its public policies carried out.142
Recognizing the validity of the Palmateer principles, the courts in
at least thirty states have adopted some type of public policy exception
to the common law at-will rule.143 Six states have rejected any modifi-
cation of the at-will rule, on the premise that the issue is best left to the
legislatures to decide.""' The remainder of the states are currently un-
decided; however, the courts in many of these states have indicated that
when appropriate cases present themselves, the courts will not be ad-
verse to finding public policy exceptions. 145
142. Id. at 878.
143. See, e.g., Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska
1986); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985);
Peterman, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,
427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw.
1982); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977); Palmateer, 421
N.E.2d 876 (III. 1981); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind.
1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka, 630 P.2d 186 (Kan. 1981); King's Daughters' Hosp.
v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d
464 (Md. 1981); Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982); Clifford v.
Cactus Drilling Corp., 353 N.W.2d 469 (Mich. 1984); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining
Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700
S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980);
Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984); Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d
1273 (N.H. 1980); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp, 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980);
Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), modified on other grounds, 687
P.2d 1038 (N.M. 1984); Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985);
Nees v. Hock, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d
174 (Pa. 1974); Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985);
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v.
Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985); Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586 (Vt. 1986);
Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d
270 (W. Va. 1978); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
144. See, e.g., Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814 (Ala. 1984);
Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Bendix
Corp. v. Flowers, 330 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412
So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas, 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss.
1981) (but see Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247 (Miss. 1985), in which the court
suggested it might well be charged with reconsidering the at-will rule in some con-
texts); Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293 (1983). The basis for
this reluctance to modify the at-will rule is somewhat questionable, since the at-will
rule is itself a creature of the common law. It is arguably not an inappropriate usurpa-
tion of legislative authority for a court to modify or clarify the scope and the extent of
a common-law rule. See Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 842.
145. See, e.g., Gaulden v. Emerson Elec., 680 S.W.2d 92 (Ark. 1984); Corbin v.
Sinclair Mktg., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Ives v. Army Times Publishing
Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981); Haldeman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 98
(Iowa 1985); Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984); Mau v.
Omaha Nat'l Bank, 299 N.W.2d 147 (Neb. 1980); Lee v. Walstad, 368 N.W.2d 542
(N.D. 1985) (refusing to recognize exception when employee reports violation to the
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An examination of some general principles will help to flesh-out
the contours of the public policy exception to the at-will rule. First,
with few exceptions, the cause of action created by wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy sounds in tort. 46 Second, unlike the anti-
retaliation provisions discussed above, the public policy exception has
so far been applied only in cases involving employee discharges. The
public policy exception has not been used to protect an employee who is
otherwise discriminated against regarding terms or conditions of em-
ployment. The rationale behind the public policy exception appears to
apply equally well to nondischarge cases, however. The potential for
the employer to abuse his economic power over an employee to the det-
riment of public policy and the community is just as real when the
employer demotes the employee or reduces his wage rate as when he
fires the employee. In such a situation, the private dealings between the
parties should be subject to some restriction for the good of the
community.14 7
Third, public policy as a principle that no one can lawfully do that
which is injurious to the public or against the public good 48 clearly
extends beyond those issues dealing solely with an employee's working
employer and suggesting that it would not recognize exception in any case); Allen v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985). But see Phung v. Waste Manage-
ment, Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986).
146. See, e.g., Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1036; Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878;
Murphy, 630 P.2d at 190; Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 733
(Ky. 1983); Hansen, 675 P.2d at 397; Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512; Vigil, 699 P.2d at 619;
Nees, 536 P.2d at 514; Ludwick, 337 S.E.2d at 216; Bowman, 331 S.E.2d at 801;
Harless, 246 S.E.2d at 275 n.5. But see Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549,
552 (N.H. 1974); Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 841 (both cases finding that a public
policy wrongful discharge action sounds in contract).
Whether a case arises in tort or contract may affect the type of remedy available,
the applicable statute of limitations, and the measure of damages. See Brockmeyer,
335 N.W.2d at 841, which held that in tort actions, the only limitation on measure-
ment of damages is proximate cause; punitive damages may also be recovered. In con-
tract actions, the measure of damages is limited by foreseeability and mitigation. Id.
147. In those cases in which changes in working conditions or terms of employ-
ment are so onerous as to force a reasonable person to quit, a case of constructive
discharge would certainly be cognizable under the public policy exception to the at-will
rule. There is ample precedent in other types of employment litigation for recognizing
such forced resignations as the legal equivalent of a discharge. See, e.g., Clark v.
Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Title VII case); J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972) (NLRA case).
148. The classic formulation of public policy was set forth by Lord Truro in
Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H.L. Cas. 1, 196 (1853), quoted in Wagenseller:
Public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject can
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or
against the public good, which may be termed, as it sometimes has been, the
policy of the law, or public policy in relation to the administration of the
law.
Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1034.
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conditions to include issues affecting the public in general. " 9 Public
policy also means, however, that the issue must implicate some "pub-
lic" policy and not merely reflect the employee's purely personal inter-
ests or purely internal workplace issues.1 50 To determine the types of
issues and activities implicating public policy, the courts look to state
and federal constitutions, statutes, regulatory schemes, and judicial
decisions.16 1
Courts have generally recognized four categories of cases in which
a discharge can violate a mandate of public policy. In the first cate-
gory, if an employer discharges an employee for refusing to perform an
illegal act, the employer conduct implicates public policy, because to
allow employment to be conditioned on performance of illegal acts
would encourage criminal conduct by employers and employees. The
public has an interest in encouraging citizens to be law-abiding, not
law-breaking. Petermann, the landmark public policy case, is an exam-
ple of the application of this rationale.6 2 Another example is found in
Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck,"" in which the company employed
Hauck as a deckhand on a boat. On one occasion, the company ordered
Hauck to pump the bilges into the water. Upon learning from the
Coast Guard that pumping bilges into the water was illegal, Hauck
refused and the company fired him. As one member of the Texas Su-
preme Court noted, "[a]llowing an employer to require an employee to
break a law or face termination cannot help but promote a thorough
disrespect for the laws and legal institutions of society.' '15 4
The second category of cases involves the discharge of an em-
ployee for reporting violations of law either to his employer or to the
149. See, e.g., Petermann v. Teamster Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959) (instructing an employee to commit perjury before legislative committee);
Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc. 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982) (employee cooperating
with government authorities on an antitrust investigation involving the employer); Sab-
ine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (employee refusal to pollute
water in violation of federal law); Harless, 246 S.E.2d at 270 (employee attempt to
enforce compliance by bank with consumer credit laws).
150. Compare Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 359 (I11. 1985) (dis-
charge for filing claim under employer's group health insurance plan is a purely private
matter not affecting society) with Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d
425 (Ind. 1973) (discharge for filing workers' compensation claim interferes with state
policy). See also Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1034 (singularly public purpose may sup-
port a claim for wrongful discharge).
151. See, e.g., Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1033-34; Parner, 652 P.2d at 631;
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878; Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512 (courts can also examine pro-
fessional codes of ethics); Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 840 (courts limited to examin-
ing constitutions and statutes).
152. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 184; see supra notes 136-40 and accompa-
nying text (discussion of the Petermann case).
153. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
154. Id. at 735 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring).
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government. The rationale supporting this is that the stated purpose
behind any given law would be frustrated if persons who are in the best
position to detect violations of the law may be discharged for reporting
them. The Connecticut Supreme Court applied this theory in Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc. '" Sheets, while employed as quality con-
trol director, began to notice deviations between the contents of his em-
ployer's food products and the specifications listed on the product la-
bels. The deviations violated the state food and drug act. Sheets
notified the employer, in writing, about the problem; shortly thereafter,
he was fired. The court held that the discharge of an employee in retal-
iation for his insistence that his employer comply with state law vio-
lates public policy."0 6 Similarly, the employee in Boyle v. Vista
Eyewear, Inc. 57 complained to both OSHA and the federal Food and
Drug Administration that legally required tests for determining the re-
sistance of eye glass lenses to breaking and shattering were not being
conducted by her employer. By discharging the employee, the employer
violated public policy."'
A third situation raising public policy issues involves the discharge
of an employee for engaging in acts that public policy encourages. For
example, in Nees v. Hocks,159 the employee was discharged after miss-
ing work because of her service as a juror. The court found a clear
indication that "the jury system and jury duty are regarded as high on
the scale of American institutions and citizen obligations."' 60 Thus, the
Court held that permitting the employer to penalize an employee who
fulfills that obligation thwarts the will of the community, and therefore
violates public policy.' 6'
The final type of case arises when an employee is discharged for
exercising statutory rights. The rationale behind finding that such a
discharge violates public policy was clearly expressed by the Supreme
Court of Indiana in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.," 2 in which
155. 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980). The rationale of this second category of cases
is very similar to the policy underlying the whistleblower laws discussed supra at notes
111-33 and accompanying text.
156. Id. at 386, 389.
157. 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
158. Id. at 878; see also Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)
(employee statements critcizing misuse of public funds); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank,
246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (employee informing his employer about bank practice
of overcharging customers in violation of state and federal consumer credit laws).
159. 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
160. Id. at 516.
161. Id. See also Parner v. American Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982)
(employee cooperating with government authorities in antitrust investigation);
Palmateer v. International Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981) (employee supplied
information to law enforcement authories concerning possible criminal conduct of fel-
low employee).
162. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
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PROTECTING WORKER COMPLAINTS
an employee was discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim:
The Act creates a duty in the employer to compensate employees for
work-related injuries (through insurance) and a right in the em-
ployee to receive such compensation. But in order for the goals of
the Act to be realized and for public policy to be effectuated, the
employee must be able to exercise his right in an unfettered fashion
without being subject to reprisal. If employers are permitted to pe-
nalize employees for filing workmen's compensation claims, a most
important public policy will be undermined. The fear of being dis-
charged would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory
right. Employees will not file claims for justly deserved compensa-
tion--opting, instead, to continue their employment without inci-
dent. The end result, of course, is that the employer is effectively
relieved of his obligation.'6 8
Those courts that recognize the public policy exception to the at-
will rule do not necessarily recognize the exception in all four types of
cases. In fact, very few state courts recognize all four. Most courts,
however, do recognize the exception when the discharge is caused by
the employee's refusal to perform an illegal act, or by the employee's
exercise of statutory rights.164
To the extent that a worker's complaint falls within one of the
enumerated exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine, he or she
may be protected from retaliatory discharge. The extent of the protec-
tion is spotty, however, and depends upon which exception, if any, a
particular state recognizes. Additionally, the complaint must implicate
some aspect of public policy and cannot relate solely to internal work-
place concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
The gaps in worker protection left by Meyers Industries may be
filled, to some extent, by statutory and common-law remedies. Before
Meyers Industries, however, the NLRA had provided a federal blanket
of protection for all covered workers; whereas the statutory and com-
163. Id. at 427. This is the same rationale behind the statutory anti-retaliation
provisions discussed supra at notes 79-111 and accompanying text.
164. A few states, however, have narrowly limited the public policy exception to
specific cases. Indiana, for example, first recognized the exception in Frampton, in
which the plaintiff was allegedly discharged for filing a worker's compensation claim.
The rationale for the exception, as expounded by the court, was broad enough to en-
compass a discharge for exercising any statutory right. See notes 162-63 and accompa-
nying text. A subsequent case, however, refused to recognize an exception beyond the
specific facts of Frampton. See Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant, 489 N.E.2d 933
(Ind. 1986) (court declined to extend the public policy exception beyond the specific
factual situation presented in Frampton because the employment at-will doctrine is the
public policy of the state, and revision is best left to the legislature).
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mon-law alternatives form a patchwork quilt whose coverage varies
from state to state. Moreover, complaints not implicating public policy,
such as those at issue in the pre-Meyers cases of Akron General Medi-
cal Center and Oklahoma Allied Telephone Co.,1'5 do not receive pro-
tection under the existing alternatives. Lastly, the mechanisms for en-
forcing the alternatives, particularly the common-law remedies, are not
as accessible as those provided in the NLRA.1 6
165. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
166. Upon filing a written complaint with a regional office of the NLRB, the
investigation and subsequent litigation of a meritorious claim is conducted at govern-
ment expense. The worker does not need to have separate, independent representation.
That is not the case when common-law remedies are sought; there the individual
worker must acquire and pay for private legal representation. See Note, Protecting
Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1931 (1983), which notes that upper level, primary market workers
make up the overwhelming majority of plaintiffs in public policy exception cases, and
suggests that the underrepresentation of secondary market workers may be due, in
part, to their inability to obtain adequate legal counsel.
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